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Marital Violence and Women’s Employment and Property Status: 
Evidence from North Indian Villages 
 
Dominant development policy approaches recommend women’s employment on the grounds 
that it facilitates their empowerment, which in turn is believed to be instrumental in enhancing 
women’s well-being. However, empirical work on the relationship between women’s 
employment status and their well-being as measured by freedom from marital violence yields 
an ambiguous picture. Motivated by this ambiguity, this paper draws on testimonies of men 
and women and data gathered from rural Uttar Pradesh, to examine the effect of women’s 
employment and asset status as measured by their participation in paid work and their 
ownership of property, respectively, on spousal violence. Unlike the existing literature, we 
treat women’s work status and violence as simultaneously determined and find that women’s 
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 I. Introduction
Historical organization of public and private spaces naturally associates women with 
private sphere and domesticity, and thus home is perceived as a woman’s domain. 
However, home is not a safe abode and around the world, women are subjected to spousal 
violence. Based on survey data, a recent multi-country study (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2006) 
pegs the incidence of intimate partner inflicted physical violence at between 15 and 71 
percent. 
Domestic violence is recognized as a violation of the basic rights of women, and 
freedom from such violence is an important aspect of women’s welfare. Domestic 
violence has severe health (physical and psychological) and social consequences for 
women (WHO, 2002). Various studies have shown (Carrillo, 1992; Heise et al., 1994, 
Menon-Sen and Shiva Kumar, 2001; Morrison and Orlando, 1999; UNICEF, 2000) the 
large economic and social costs of domestic violence. Violence or even the threat of 
violence   constrains   the   choices   women   make   and   restricts   their   participation   in 
development, thus, preventing them from realizing their full potential (ICRW, 1999, 
2000, 2002). 
Empirical evidence on violence against women in India is available from various 
sources. For instance, the National Family Health Survey III (NFHS III) conducted in 
2005-06 (IIPS and Macro International, 2007) reveals that about one in three married 
women in India have experienced physical violence. According to a nationwide survey 
conducted by the International Center for Women's Research, 52 per cent of women have 
suffered at least one incident of physical or psychological violence in their lifetime 
(ICRW, 2000). 
Beyond the incidence of violence, there is a small but growing body of literature 
which uses information from various parts of India (and elsewhere) to examine the 
2empirical link between domestic violence and various socio-economic attributes. One 
strand of the literature focuses on the link between domestic violence (women’s welfare) 
and dowry. Examples include, Bloch and Rao (2002) and Srinivasan and Bedi (2007) for 
India, Naved and Persson (2005) for Bangladesh and Zhang and Chan (1999) for Taiwan. 
A second stand of the literature examines the links between domestic violence and 
women’s involvement in income generating activities as captured by a woman’s earnings 
and participation in paid employment, and between violence and women’s ownership of 
economic assets (gold and property). Theoretically, the effect of a woman’s intra-
household economic status on violence is ambiguous. While an increase in household 
economic resources attributable to a woman may reduce economic stress and spousal 
violence, it may also introduce additional tension and struggle within a household. In an 
effort to maintain the status quo, the increased economic strength of a woman may be 
countered by an increase in violence. Consistent with this theoretical ambiguity, the 
existing empirical evidence on the link between a woman’s involvement in income 
generating activities and violence is not clear-cut.
1  In the Indian context, Rao’s (1997) 
study on a community in Karnataka shows that a wife’s income is associated with 
reduced lifetime violence. With regard to women’s employment, Jejeebhoy (1998) finds 
that a woman’s employment in wage work has no statistically significant impact on the 
probability of experiencing violence in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, while based on 
NFHS II, Kishor and Johnson (2004) report that, as compared to non-working women, 
women being paid in cash were more likely to have experienced lifetime physical 
violence. In contrast, Panda and Agarwal (2005) report that in Kerala, women with 
1 In a recent survey of the link between marital violence and women’s involvement in income generation in 
developing countries, Vyas and Watts (2008) report that women’s involvement in such activities is 
generally associated with a higher lifetime history of physical violence, although in three of the twenty sites 
the authors reported a statistically significant protective association and in five there was no association. 
Based on studies from twenty two sites which examined the link between women’s involvement in income 
generation in the past year, the authors report that five recorded a protective association, six recorded a 
greater risk, while the rest did not find any association.   
3regular employment as compared to unemployed women, were far less likely to have ever 
experienced violence. Beyond employment status, Panda and Agarwal’s innovative study 
(2005) uses women’s ownership of property (land and house) to capture economic status 
and finds that women’s ownership of property is associated with a sharp reduction in 
domestic violence.
The ambiguities in the link between women’s economic status and intimate 
partner violence may be driven by the tension between the protective influence of higher 
economic contribution and the threat to the image of the male bread winner, as well as 
context-specific reasons. In addition, an empirical concern which has rarely been 
addressed is the endogeneity between a woman’s economic status (employment, income) 
and violence.
2 For instance, as is the key concern in the developed country literature (see 
Staggs and Riger, 2005; Tolman and Wang, 2005), violence may inhibit women’s 
participation in employment or women who experience violence may be more likely to 
seek paid employment. If women who experience violence are more likely to seek paid 
employment, then estimates that do not account for the simultaneous determination of 
paid employment and domestic violence are likely to overestimate the effect of women’s 
income/employment status on domestic violence and draw the misleading conclusion that 
women with higher earnings or those engaged in paid work are more likely to experience 
violence.
3        
2 Rao (1997) points out that, women’s income and violence may be endogenously determined but is unable 
to correct for this possibility due to lack of instrumental variables. A notable exception is Gibson-Davies et 
al. (2005) who use data from the United States and present instrumental variable estimates of the effect of 
women’s employment on domestic violence.  
3 Gibson-Davies et al. (2005) study of low-income women in the United States shows that estimates that do 
not account for the endogeneity between domestic violence and employment grossly overestimate the effect 
of women’s employment status on abuse. Indeed, correcting for endogeneity leads to sharply different 
results and while probit estimates reveal a zero or positive relationship between employment and abuse, the 
instrumental variable probit estimates show that, for all types of violence, employment is associated with a 
reduction in violence of between 4 to 8 percentage points.
4Our paper belongs to the genre of work that examines the link between women’s 
employment  status  and  ownership  of  economic  assets  on domestic  violence.    In 
particular, based on qualitative and quantitative primary data collected from eight villages 
of Kaushambi district in Uttar Pradesh, a northern Indian state, this paper examines the 
link between women’s participation in paid work and women’s ownership of property on 
domestic violence. While there are other papers that have examined such links, this paper 
offers several relatively novel features. First, unlike other papers in this area which are 
usually based only on responses from females, this paper draws its insights from the 
testimonies of women and men.  Information from both women and men allows us to 
compare the reasons both sexes provide for the use of violence and allows us to gauge the 
extent to which violence may be under-reported. Second, in our empirical work we 
attempt   to   control   for   the   potentially   endogenous   relationship   between   women’s 
engagement in paid work and spousal violence. Third, while there are a number of papers 
that have examined the link between women’s income/employment and violence, the link 
between women’s ownership of land and property is restricted to Panda and Agarwal 
(2005). Their paper on the effect of women’s ownership of property on violence is based 
on Kerala, a South Indian state where a substantial proportion of the population follows a 
matrilineal system and where women enjoy relatively more autonomy and freedom of 
movement, as compared to the North. In contrast, this paper examines whether the 
violence-reducing effects of property ownership also prevail in a North Indian state 
which has a strong patrilineal system and where women enjoy relatively less autonomy. 
The following section of the paper provides a brief description of the study area 
and the data. Section III provides a discussion of female employment patterns and 
spousal violence in the study area and discusses the relationship between women’s 
5employment and asset status and spousal violence. Section IV outlines the empirical 
specification. Section V discusses the econometric estimates and section VI concludes.
II. The context and the data  
The paper is based on information from Kaushambi, a relatively less developed district in 
Uttar Pradesh (henceforth UP), a northern state of India. According to Census 2001 data, 
Kaushambi has a high degree of illiteracy (70 percent amongst women and 38 percent 
amongst men, as compared to corresponding state-level averages of 58 percent and 31 
percent, respectively), and a high infant mortality rate (100 per 1000 live births as 
compared to the state-level figure of 87 per 1000 live births). 
Hindus constitute the majority of the state’s population (about 85 percent) and the 
social order in the state is based on the caste system amongst the Hindus. As in other 
north Indian states, gender relations are driven by patriarchal socio-cultural norms which 
are,   as   noted   by   Agarwal   (1988,   p.92),   ‘characterized   by   lower   female   labour 
participation (and higher gender disparities in participation), a higher incidence of dowry, 
greater intra-household discrimination against female children, and lower female (to 
male) survival chances than the southern states’. 
Empirical confirmation of the nature of gender disparities comes from various 
sources. For instance, 2001 census figures show that at 43 percent, female literacy rate in 
the state is considerably lower than average female literacy rate (65 percent) in the four 
Southern states (Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu).  Similarly, female 
labour force participation rate is 29 percent in Uttar Pradesh as compared to 45 percent in 
the Southern states (Planning Commission, 2002). Dowry differences across regions also 
reflect the asymmetric gender relations and a recent study by Dalmia and Lawrence 
(2005) reports that dowries are twenty eight per cent higher in Uttar Pradesh (north India) 
than in Karnataka (south India). The lower chances of female survival are reflected in the 
6state’s population sex ratio of 898 females per 1000 males which may be compared to the 
average population sex ratio of 997 in the four Southern states (Census of India, 2001).
II.B The data 
The data used in this paper were collected in 2006 and the data collection process 
was designed to deal with two issues. First, to examine the role of women’s economic 
status (as captured by their participation in paid employment and ownership of assets) on 
their mobility, freedom from violence and their decision-making domain and the effect of 
women’s work participation on the health of their children (in the age group 0-5). Given 
these aims, Kaushambi district was chosen as it has a relatively high rate of female work 
participation as compared to the rest of the state.
4 In order to explore caste and class 
variations within Kaushambi district, data was gathered from eight multi-religious and 
multi-caste villages. 
A variety of data collection  methods was used. At the district level,  key 
informants included the District Magistrate (head of the district administration) and the 
Chief Medical Officer, who were interviewed to gather background information on the 
district, while village level information on characteristics such as number of households, 
occupational pattern, presence of physical infrastructure, education and health facilities 
was collected by interviewing village leaders, Anganwadi workers (workers in charge of 
the village child care centre) and teachers. Eight focus group discussions were conducted 
to elicit information about familial norms, intra-household decision making, access to and 
control over resources, and their daily routine. In addition to these discussions, five life 
stories of women from different age/caste groups were documented, which threw light on 
intra-household dynamics, changes in socio-economic and cultural patterns. 
4 According to data from Census 2001, the rate of female work participation rate in rural Kaushambi is 31 
percent versus 19 percent in rural Uttar Pradesh.
7At the household level, a semi-structured survey was fielded in 155 households, 
that is, about 20 households from each of the eight villages.
5 Given the aims of the study, 
the target population was defined as complete pair households, that is, both husband and 
wife are alive and living in the same physical space, with at least one child in the age 
group 0 to 5.  Households satisfying these criteria were further sub-divided into those in 
which women participated regularly in paid work (that is, women who worked more than 
6 months during the year) and those in which women did not engage regularly in paid 
work. About half the respondents were randomly chosen from each of these two groups. 
At the household level both husbands and wives were canvassed.  The survey gathered a 
wide range of information on issues such as educational and employment status, 
economic  status and  ownership  of assets, intra-household  allocation   of resources, 
household violence, income and income sharing patterns, mobility and decision making. 
Given the purposive manner in which the sample data have been gathered 
(focusing on an area with a relatively higher rate of female work participation and on 
complete pair households with a young child), it should be clear that our aim is not to 
generalize our findings for women in the state or even the district, but to examine 
whether in the particular context of a poor North Indian rural setting characterized by a 
patrilineal system and relatively low status of women, whether the economic status of 
women has a bearing on their welfare.
6 
III. Female employment status and domestic violence
5 The econometric work reported in the paper relies on a relatively small data set of 155 households. This is 
not large but is not unusually small. Recently published studies such as Bloch and Rao (2002) and 
Srinivasan and Bedi (2007) rely on about 137 to 142 households.. While the small size has its 
disadvantages, it also has the advantage of allowing coverage of a wide range of topics and the collection of 
reliable information on sensitive issues. 
 
6 In other words the paper is concerned with internal validity – that is attempting to isolate the causal effect 
of women’s economic status on spousal violence - and not with generalization or external validity. 
8This section provides an analytical narrative designed to aid the specification of our 
econometric model and help interpret estimates. Based on discussions with men and 
women, their remarks during focus group discussions, life-histories of key respondents 
and responses to structured questionnaires, this section provides an account of female 
employment  status, characterizes domestic violence and subsequently explores the 
expected effects of several socio-economic variables of interest on the incidence of 
violence.
III.A Female employment and attitude towards working women
Consistent with the research design, as displayed in Table 1, about half the 
women in the sample are engaged in paid work. About 43 percent are working regularly 
as agricultural labourers (at least 6 months of the year) while six percent are engaged in 
non-agricultural occupations. On average, women in the sample account for about 17 
percent   of   household   income.   Conditional   on   being   engaged   in   paid   work,   the 
contribution of women to household income jumps to about 35 percent.  
The survey contained a number of questions designed to explore the factors 
motivating women’s participation in paid labour, and the attitudes of their husbands and 
other family members regarding their work participation. Female work patterns differ 
remarkably across castes, with work participation rates varying from 83 percent amongst 
the lower castes to only 26 percent amongst women belonging to the general caste group. 
Amongst Hindu lower castes and Muslim households, women’s work force participation 
is poverty-driven and women reported that children’s well-being was the primary 
motivation driving their decision to seek paid employment. Given their lack of assets and 
the limited earning capabilities of their husbands, they reported that they had no choice 
but to work. The general sentiment may be captured by a statement made by a  female 
lower-caste agricultural wage labourer,
9If we do not work who will feed our kids?
A majority, about 76%, of husbands (87% if wife worked and 65% if wife was not 
working) supported work participation of their wives and pointed out that the main 
benefit was that their economic contribution would allow them to share household 
expenses and reduce the burden on husbands.
7 For example, according to the husband of 
a lower-caste agricultural wage labourer, 
Her earning contributes to family income and she can also fulfill some of her 
wishes, which I am not able to fulfill.
A similar sentiment comes from the husband of an upper-caste woman engaged in a non-
agricultural government job,
She is in a government job, so if my business does not run well she will be able to 
support the family with her stable income. She will be able to bring up our kids in 
a better manner.
Support and recognition of the contribution of women’s work extended beyond 
husbands. In joint families, in general, mother-in-laws approved of their daughter-in-
laws’ employment outside the family farm. Some mother-in-laws had themselves worked 
as wage labourers, while some were still working and the general perception was that 
women’s work force participation would help the family in its daily battle for survival, 
contribute to family well-being and allow women to be independent and earn respect in 
society. For instance, commenting on her daughter-in-law’s work participation, an upper-
caste mother-in-law commented, 
She can provide economic support to her family. She does not have to ask for 
money from anyone and it will increase her self-confidence.
For a few husbands the economic contribution of their wives was not important, 
and they felt that women should work as they need to be occupied. As a husband of a 
lower-caste wage labourer commented, 
7 The responses were remarkably similar across caste groups with support for work participation ranging 
from 72 to 78 percent across caste groups.
10Women waste their time on idle gossip and quarreling with each other. So they 
should utilize their time and earn some money. 
While the overall impression gathered from the focus groups, conversations and 
responses to the structured questions was that women’s economic contribution is valued, 
responses from the focus group discussion to questions on the effect of women’s work on 
their status were not as positive. According to a lower caste unemployed husband,
Women’s participation in low wage work does not improve their self-worth, as 
they earn a paltry sum and their income does not make any change in their intra-
household status.
Working women’s self-perception varied across caste/class. Upper caste women 
engaged in service sector (who also belonged to the economically better-off households) 
felt that their economic contribution was acknowledged within the family and it gave 
them self-respect and respect from family and community.
8 However, among the lower 
castes, women asserted that their work did not improve their worth. According to a 
lower-caste wage labourer, 
We women do not have any worth irrespective of the fact whether we earn or not. 
We are loved only at night by our husbands, and we do not have right to say ‘no’. 
We always have to listen to our husbands.  
While a majority of husbands recognized and valued the work contribution of 
their   wives,   a   majority   (about   76%)   pointed   out   that   there   were   disadvantages. 
Specifically, amongst husbands expressing reservations, 60% pointed out that women’s 
work participation would affect the upbringing of children and their physical and 
cognitive   development.
9  Other   concerns   were   the   negative   health   consequences 
(tiredness) of work on their wives, which would reduce their ability to carry out 
household chores and compel their husbands to contribute to household work. 
8 Only 3 of them were working.
9 Except for the general caste group which expressed a higher rate (about 77 percent) of concern about the 
effect of women’s work participation on the welfare of children the rest of the caste/religion groups 
expressed a similar rate of reservation (between 56 and 60 percent). 
11To summarize, women’s work participation rates differ sharply across caste 
groups with extremely high rates of participation amongst lower caste groups and 
relatively lower rates of participation amongst the general caste. The figures in Table 1 
and the comments made by women support the idea that women’s work participation is 
driven mainly by economic imperatives and concerns for their children. Across all caste 
groups, there seems to be support for female work participation and female work appears 
to be valued, while at the same time there are concerns the impact of their work on their 
ability to look after children and discharge household responsibilities.     
III.B Domestic violence – A characterization 
There is no universally accepted definition of domestic violence. The boundaries 
of the relationship between the perpetrator and the abused, the norms of acceptable 
behaviour and specific acts constituting violence are crucial elements in defining 
domestic violence.
10 In this paper we restrict ourselves to the incidence of inter-spousal 
physical violence that has taken place anytime during the course of a marriage.
11 
The information collected from the study villages shows that while there are 
instances of other family members inflicting violence on the respondent (wife), the 
husband is the primary assailant. Based on the responses of wives, 52 percent of them 
have experienced physical violence during the course of their marriage.
12 In terms of 
husbands’ responses, while fewer men were willing to respond to this question, about 59 
10 See ICRW (1999) for a discussion on definitional issues. 
11 Physical violence includes acts such as slapping, beating, arm-twisting, stabbing, strangling, kicking, 
burning. A focus on physical violence excludes emotional violence and is likely to underestimate the extent 
of total violence (emotional and physical). Data from NFHS III (IIPS and Macro International, 2007) shows 
that while this is indeed the case the extent of the underestimate is not large. For example, lifetime 
incidence of physical/sexual violence is about 37.2 percent. The inclusion of emotional violence increases 
this figure to 39.7 percent. This underestimate of about 3 percentage points remains the same across wealth 
classes, levels of female education, and caste.   
12 This figure may be compared with the 38 percent lifetime physical violence incidence rate reported in 
Uttar Pradesh based on NFHS III (IIPS and Macro International, 2007). This figure is somewhat lower than 
the figure found in the current sample but may partially be explained by the focus of this paper on women 
who are married while the NFHS III data pertain to all women in the age range 15-49.
12percent of those who did respond mentioned that they had beaten their wives.  There is a 
high degree of consistency in the responses of husbands and wives and both provide the 
same response in 78 percent of the cases.  Assuming that both husbands and wives have a 
tendency to underreport violence, the figures in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that men are far 
more likely to underreport as compared to women. In 16 out of 44 cases men who 
indicated using no violence are contradicted by their wives while only 8 of 65 women 
contradict their husband’s claims of using violence. While there is underreporting, the 
consistent responses across men and women and the fairly limited degree of the 
underreporting supports the idea that these data on a sensitive issue such as domestic 
violence are not unduly influenced by measurement error.  
The survey and discussions reveal that there are a variety of factors that trigger 
physical violence and there are sharp differences in the motives for inflicting violence as 
reported by husbands and wives (see Table 5). As far as husbands are concerned, the 
most common reason for using violence appears to be a need to discipline women if they 
challenge male authority and/or if they do not perform tasks as expected. About 73 
percent of husbands admitted using violence when women were “disobedient,” that is, 
when women questioned or objected to their behaviour (gambling, drinking), did not 
follow their instructions, and confronted mother-in-laws.  About 46 percent of husbands 
used violence when household tasks were not properly performed by their wives (for 
example, food was not cooked properly and on time, clothes were not washed or children 
were not taken care of) and 11 percent mentioned the use of violence when women 
crossed a “private boundary” - by talking to other women, not observing  purdah  or 
meeting relatives without a husband’s permission.  
While a similar percentage of women (46 percent) support the idea that violence 
in the form of punishment for neglecting housework triggers violence, the responses 
13provided by women provide a different picture of the reasons for violence. The key 
differences are the larger proportion of women who point out that violence (and drinking) 
is used by men as a way of releasing stress, anger and frustration.  According to about 30 
percent of the women, men’s failure as a provider and their injured masculinity fuels 
violence and that wife beating is an outlet for the economic and social stress that they 
experience. 
In the sample, the use of violence was justified by about half the women (50 
percent) and a majority of men (80 percent). While female justification of wife-beating is 
not unusual in the Indian context, the interesting aspect of these numbers is that the 
percentage is ‘only’ about 50 percent. This figure may be contrasted with a justification 
rate of 74% amongst a sample of women from Uttar Pradesh in 1993-94 as reported in 
Jejeebhoy (1998). While half the women mentioned that violence was justified at times 
and under certain circumstances, a similar percentage vociferously condemned the 
practice. For example, lower-caste women in one of the villages publicly expressed 
strong views against violence, used abusive language against men and mentioned that it 
was a pity that despite their valuable economic contribution, men beat them up. 
Overall, while men resort to violence as a means of controlling women and as a 
pedagogical tool to discipline them for various transgressions, women viewed violence as 
an outlet for male stress and as a burden that they need to bear as part of marriage 
responsibilities. 
III.C Domestic violence and socio-economic correlates
Drawing  on the characterization   provided  above,  the following  sub-section 
provides a discussion of the expected effects of the main variables of interest on the 
incidence of violence. 
14Income and employment
Based on the idea of economic stress as a source of violence it may be expected 
that an expansion of household economic resources, for example, due to an increase in 
income or an increase in land holding should ease economic stress and in turn reduce 
violence. In particular, since agricultural land is the key income generating asset in the 
village, an increase in access to land should be associated with a decline in violence. 
While an increase in overall economic resources should relieve the stress experienced by 
a husband, the source of the increased resources probably plays a key role in determining 
the relative welfare of the members of the household.  An increase in the economic 
resources of the household, attributable to the husband, may unambiguously be expected 
to reduce economic stress and in turn to a reduction in violence. A husband’s improved 
employment prospects should exert a similar effect. In contrast, an increase in household 
economic resources attributable to the wife may be expected to have an ambiguous effect 
on violence.  While an increase in earnings reduces economic stress it may also introduce 
additional tension and struggle within the household.  In an effort to extract and control 
the increased income and to counter the threat to the image of the male bread winner a 
man may resort to violence. 
Thus, unlike the divorce-threat models presented by Farmer and Tiefenthaler 
(1997) and Zhang and Chan (1999) which predict that an increase in a woman’s income 
unambiguously decreases the level of violence/increases welfare in intact marriages 
through its effect on raising her threat point or the separate-spheres bargaining models 
presented by Lundberg and Pollack (1993) and Suen, Chan and Zhang (2003) which 
show that even when divorce is not an option an increase in a woman’s income increases 
her welfare, our characterization of violence combined  with the context under scrutiny 
suggests that the effect will be ambiguous. 
15The divorce-threat models are unlikely to apply in the current context. In much of 
rural India it is not easy for a woman to leave a marriage.  Even if a woman can support 
herself financially and live on her own, leaving a husband is likely to invite strong social 
disapproval. Whitehead in her study (1981:109) on the conjugal contract points out that 
‘the relative power of husbands and wives does not simply reflect relative wages 
commanded in the labour market’. Regardless of their employment and income prospects, 
familial ideologies about roles and responsibilities, of society’s expectations, may often 
lead women to continue in a marriage. Kabeer (2000, p. 52) notes that, when the ideology 
of ‘togetherness’ is the primary organizing principle in a society, women invest time and 
energy to keep their marriage alive, seeking separation only in extreme circumstances. 
This view is corroborated by a female lower-caste woman engaged as a wage labourer 
who mentioned that though she did not approve of her husband’s act of beating, she never 
thought of leaving him, as “only chinnals (characterless) women leave their husbands”. 
Apart from the social stigma of divorce, even if credible, the need for male protection 
may also prevent women from exiting a marriage.  Men’s traditional role as a “protector” 
is still likely to prevail in the current context, even if women engaged in paid work do not 
need them as “providers”.
Even if divorce is not an option, as in the separates-spheres bargaining models, 
and an increase in a woman’s earnings increases her welfare in terms of increased 
consumption and leads to a “clearer perception of her individuality and well being” (Sen 
1990, p. 144), this may not always translate into reduced violence.
13   Given the use of 
violence as a way of retaining control it is quite possible that an increase in consumption 
induced by an increase in women’s income is accompanied by additional control-induced 
13 Sen (1990) argues that “Outside earnings can give the woman in question a better breakdown position, 
possibly a clearer perception of her individuality and well being and a higher  ‘perceived contribution’ to 
the family’s economic position.”  This argument may still hold without necessarily translating into reduced 
violence.
16violence.  This is similar to the possibly ambiguous effects of income on violence as 
proposed by Tauchen et al. (1991).  Based on a non-cooperative family model Tauchen et 
al. (1991) point out that, if a man’s marginal utility of violence were increasing with a 
woman’s consumption then he may allow her greater consumption but also inflict more 
violence, as her income increases. 
Overall, leaving a marriage is unlikely to present a credible threat to a husband 
and while the additional earnings capacity of a woman may expand the consumption 
possibilities of the wife and the household it may also invite additional violence 
Thus, the effect of an increase in a woman’s earnings and an improvement in her 
employment prospects are likely to have an ambiguous effect on violence.
Wealth and education
Paralleling the discussion above, while an expansion of household wealth in the 
form of greater ownership of gold and ownership of a dwelling should reduce economic 
stress and violence, the ownership of such assets probably plays a key role in determining 
relative welfare of the husband and wife.  An increase in assets which are owned by a 
husband and under his control may unambiguously be expected to lead to a reduction in 
violence. An increase in assets owned by a wife, while reducing household economic 
stress, may have an ambiguous effect on violence. While ownership of an asset such as a 
house may provide a credible exit option from a marriage (as argued by Panda and 
Agarwal, 2005), and provide a shield for women, it may induce additional control-fuelled 
marital violence.
14  
The predicted effects of education on domestic violence are similar to the 
differential patterns expected for an increase in the incomes of the husband and wife. 
While an increase in husband’s education through its effect on income and reinforced 
14 Panda and Agarwal (2005) argue that it is not an issue of whether women actually use the exit option that 
ownership of property provides, but that the existence of such an option may be expected to deter marital 
violence.
17through its effect on his social standing may be expected to reduce violence, the effect of 
women’s education on violence may be ambiguous.   To the extent that a woman’s 
education is associated with an increase in income it should reduce violence. However, 
her education and awareness may also be a source of social stress for the man as it may 
challenge the traditional male image.  In order to assert his authority, he may resort to 
violence. 
Overall,   for   both   economic   flows   (income   and   employment)   and 
assets/endowments (wealth and education), while increases attributable to the husband 
may be expected to reduce violence, the effect of increased income and assets attributable 
to women will have an ambiguous effect on violence and will be an outcome of the 
tension between the reduced intra-household economic stress which works towards 
reducing violence and the potential increases in control-induced violence (social stress). 
Excessive alcohol consumption 
A number of women pointed out the link between alcohol and violence. In 
response to questions on the reasons for violence, several respondents mentioned that 
their husbands resort to violence when they are drunk.  It is likely that the same observed 
and unobserved factors that create economic and social stress and lead a man to inflict 
violence   are   likely   to   drive   excessive   alcohol   consumption.   This   suggests   that 
drunkenness should not be treated as an exogenous variable but as an outcome of the 
same factors that may drive a man’s violent actions.   This view is corroborated by 
extensive reviews of the literature. These reviews confirm a strong association between 
excessive alcohol consumption and violence but point out that alcohol typically triggers 
violent behavior mainly in interaction with a number of other factors, ranging from socio-
economic, cultural to psychological and biochemical. These reports conclude that while 
18alcohol abuse may spark violent behavior and serve as a catalyst, it is a symptom and not 
a cause of aggressive behaviour (The Amsterdam Group Report 2001).
15 
To summarize, on the basis of the discussion presented here it may be expected 
that women in households with larger economic resources experience less violence. An 
increase in employment, income and assets of a man are likely to reduce violence, while 
increases in the employment, income and assets of a woman may have an ambiguous 
effect on violence.  
IV. Empirical Specification
The hypotheses outlined above are testable and this section outlines a framework to 
subject our expectations to empirical scrutiny.  Let V, a dichotomous variable, denote the 
presence of physical violence in the household.  Based on the discussion in the preceding 
section,  V  may be treated as a function of variables capturing the overall economic 
position of the household (XE), a husband’s socio-economic characteristics (XH), a wife’s 
socio-economic characteristics (XW), and a vector of additional explanatory variables 
(XO).  Thus, violence may be represented as, 
e b b b b + + + + = O O W W H H E E X X X X V . (1)
The βs are coefficients to be estimated and ε represents unobservable factors which may 
influence violence. Based on the assumption that ε follows a normal distribution this 
equation may be estimated using a probit model.   
15 A report prepared by The Social Issues Research Centre (1998) reaches a similar conclusion, “From the 
research evidence available, we can conclude that there is no direct causal relationship between alcohol and 
violence. Where the immediate social context is non-aggressive and where cultural beliefs and norms 
inhibit aggression, drinkers are highly unlikely to become aggressive”. 
19In operational terms, V captures the incidence of inter-spousal physical violence. 
The overall economic position of the household is captured by the amount of land owned 
by a household, the quality of their house (kuchha-weak or pucca-strong), and the amount 
of gold owned by the household. The husband’s socio-economic characteristics include 
his occupation (self-employed in agriculture, agricultural wage labour, employed in non-
agricultural activities), annual income, years of education, age and whether he drinks. 
The wife’s characteristics include whether she is involved in paid work (wage labourer, 
non-agricultural activities), her annual income, years of education, age, and whether she 
owns the family house. Other variables included in the specification indicate number of 
male and female children, caste, religion and type of marital family (joint or nuclear). We 
estimate several variants of (1) to examine the sensitivity of the key economic status 
variables (women’s employment status and house ownership) to changes in model 
specification.     
A key concern is the potential endogeneity between a woman’s working status 
and violence.  It is possible that unobserved factors such as her ability and aspirations, 
which may motivate violence may also influence a women’s working status. In other 
words, violence and working status maybe simultaneously determined and women who 
experience violence may be driven by the violence to seek work.  These possibilities 
suggest that in equation (1), work status may be positively correlated with the error term 
and single-equation estimates of the effect of work status on violence may be upward 
biased reflecting the effect that women experiencing more violence are more likely to 
work.  To tackle this issue we use two strategies. First, we control for a number of 
observed variables which are likely to influence both violence and women’s work 
participation. To the extent that women’s work participation and violence are driven by 
observed characteristics such as household economic assets and husband’s  employment 
20status, inclusion of such controls should reduce the extent of the upward bias in the 
female   employment   status   variables.   Second,   and   more   formally,   we   endogenize 
woman’s work status and estimate a simultaneous two-equation violence and work status 
model. Specifically, woman’s work status (that is engaged in paid outside the home) 
denoted by (Ww) is treated as a function of a vector of explanatory variables (X2), that is, 
n d + = 2 X Ww . (2)
The vector X2 contains several variables that overlap with the variables in (1) but it also 
contains variables that determine work status but are assumed not to have a bearing on 
violence (excluded from the violence equation). Assuming that the error term in (2) is 
normally distributed, equations (1) and (2) are simultaneously estimated using a bivariate 
probit model.   
While model estimation is straightforward, a key issue in such procedures is 
identification and the validity of exclusion restrictions.  In the current case, there are 
some natural and potentially very strong candidates that may serve as instruments.  For 
instance, caste captures a family’s economic and social standing and as may be expected 
is a crucial variable in determining work status.  The caste of a family should be strongly 
correlated with work status but should have no bearing on violence, after controlling for 
the economic resources of a household.
16  Additionally, as pointed out in Section IIIA, 
presence of young children and type and size of family are likely to influence women’s 
work participation but may not have a direct bearing on violence.  In our empirical work 
we estimate specifications using various combinations of caste indicators, number of 
16 Support for this idea comes from various sources. In particular, a number of ICRW (1999, 2000, 2002) 
studies explore the links between caste and domestic violence.  ICRW’s study on Rajasthan reports that 
there is “no significant variation with respect to the caste of the respondent”. Similarly, ICRW’s Tamil 
Nadu study finds that 43 percent of non-Dalit men have inflicted physical violence as compared to 45 
percent among Dalit men.  Srinivasan and Bedi’s (2007) study on Tamil Nadu also reports that there is no 
link between caste and violence after controlling for household economic status. As will be discussed later, 
in our case we find that after controlling for household economic resources, caste variables do not exert a 
statistically significant impact on violence.    
21male and female children and type of family as instruments and test the validity and 
strength of our instruments.  
V. Empirical analysis
A. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are provided in Table 6.  Some 
of the salient features of these data are discussed below.  The average land holding is 3.95 
bighas or about one-fourth of an acre, which is quite small, and about 37 percent of 
households do not own any land.  Although husbands are typically more educated than 
wives (6 years versus 3 years) the average education level is quite low. About 68 percent 
of women are illiterate while the corresponding figure for men is 34 percent. As may be 
expected, given the target population, the average couple is the sample is relatively young 
with a mean age of 32 for men and 28 for women. About 9% of the women report that 
they own the house in which the family lives. While female ownership of property is 
limited, given the North Indian context, it is not unexpected. In fact compared with the 16 
percent female house ownership rate in rural Kerala (Panda and Agarwal, 2005) the 
figure here may not seem too low. The average number of children per household is three 
and a half with an equal proportion of boys and girls.  About 23 percent of the men 
consume alcohol. While this may not appear to be alarming, it should not be interpreted 
as benign social drinking but as an indicator that a man drinks excessively.
17  
B. Domestic violence and selected characteristics   
As a preview to the econometric work, Table 7 shows the bivariate relationship 
between domestic violence and some selected characteristics. The numbers clearly show 
that domestic violence is less likely to occur in better-off households.   Households 
17 In the current context, drinking alcohol may be viewed as synonymous with excessive drinking. Rao 
(1997) makes a similar point and reports that 75% of men do not consume any alcohol but “those who do 
tend to consume a great deal”.
22experiencing domestic violence have smaller land holdings (2.21 as compared to 5.87 
bighas)   and   are   less   likely   to   live   in  pucca  houses  
(14.8 versus 31 percent). The education levels of the husband and wife have similar 
effects on domestic violence supporting the idea that better-educated households are less 
likely to experience violence.  While, neither husband’s or wife’s income appear to be 
correlated with violence, there are sharp differences in the incidence of violence across 
husband’s occupation. Husbands who are agricultural wage labourers (those with lowest 
incomes) are far more likely to inflict violence while working as a self-employed farmer 
(highest income category) is negatively associated with violence. 
A wife’s engagement in wage work appears to be associated with increased 
violence. The incidence of paid work amongst women experiencing violence is 56 
percent as compared to 42 percent amongst those free of violence. While the higher 
incidence of violence amongst working women should not be construed as the effect of 
work on violence, as women from poorer households and those experiencing more 
violence are more likely to work, the correlation presented here highlights the importance 
of controlling for variables that influence female work participation (endogenizing work 
participation) as in the absence of such controls there may be a tendency to draw 
misleading conclusions. In any case, it is interesting to note that consistent with the 
literature from other developing countries, as reviewed in Vyas and Watts (2008), the 
bivariate analysis presented here is consistent with their conclusion that, in general, 
women’s access to income is associated with a  higher  lifetime history of physical 
violence. In contrast to the effect of women’s work status, a wife’s ownership of a house 
is associated with a sharp reduction in violence.  Female household ownership is about 16 
percent amongst those who do not experience violence as compared to two percent 
amongst those who do.       
23C. Single equation probit estimates
Table 8 presents estimates  of several probit specifications  of the violence 
equation.  Following the narrative provided in the earlier sections, the discussion focuses 
on the role of household economic resources, and the socio-economic characteristics of 
the husband and wife in influencing the probability of experiencing violence. 
We begin with what may be termed a “canonical” specification (Table 8, 
specification 1), variants of which have been estimated in other studies on domestic 
violence (for example, see Aekplakorn and Kongsakon, 2007; Flake, 2005; Jejeebhoy, 
1998; Hindin and Adair, 2002; Naved and Persson, 2005; Rao, 1997).
18 The common 
feature of this specification is that it does not control for husband’s occupational status 
which, as will be discussed later, is a key variable driving the decision of a wife to seek 
work and also influences violence.   Based on this specification we may draw the 
conclusion that there is no association between a woman’s work status and violence. The 
interesting aspect here is that although not precisely estimated, the coefficient indicates 
that   controlling   for   household   economic   resources,   women’s   work   is   negatively 
correlated with violence. This may be compared with the bivariate table (Table 7) which 
shows a positive link between women’s work and violence. The differences across tables 
highlights the importance of controlling for variables that are likely to have an effect on 
violence and women’s work participation before assessing the effect of women’s work on 
violence. 
Table 8, specification 2, includes controls for the occupational status of husbands 
and as is displayed in the table there is a sharp change in the coefficient on women’s 
18 While there are wide variations in the specifications that are estimated across these papers, their common 
characteristic (as in the specification presented in Table 8, spec. 1) is that they do not control for husband’s 
occupational status.  Hindin and Adair (2002) control for husband’s employment status (works for pay or 
not) but given that 92 percent of the husbands in their sample work, this is not a very informative variable. 
Papers that do attempt to account for husband’s job quality/occupation include Panda and Agarwal (2005) 
who control for husband’s type of employment (regular and seasonal employment) while Kishor and 
Johnson (2004) control for husband’s occupational status (agriculture or non-agriculture).   
24work status. The effect is now statistically significant at conventional levels and the 
coefficient indicates that women engaged in paid work outside the household are about 
22 percentage points less likely to experience violence as compared to women who do 
not work or work on the family farm. The sharp change in the absolute value of the 
coefficient indicates that in the absence of controls for husband’s occupational status the 
coefficient on women’s work status will be upward biased (more positive than it should 
be) and may lead to the misleading conclusion that there is a positive link between 
violence and work. To probe the effect of female work we split the work status variable 
into three different categories, that is working outside the home as an agricultural 
labourer, working in non-agricultural occupations and working on the family farm. As the 
estimates (Table 8, specification 3 to 5) show, the protective effect of women’s 
employment on violence, a reduction of between 24 to 29 percentage points, comes 
mainly from women working as agricultural wage labourers (regular employment for at 
least 6 months a year). The effect of working in non-agricultural activities is not 
statistically significant, probably due to the small number of women engaged in such 
work. The interesting aspect is that working on the family farm does not offer any 
protection and women whose main activity is working on the family farm are likely to 
experience as much violence as non-working women. 
  As far as the other key variable of interest - female property ownership - is 
concerned, consistent with the findings of Panda and Agarwal (2005), there is a clear link 
between   women’s   ownership   of   property   and   violence.   Across   all   specifications, 
women’s ownership of property is associated with a 33 to 36 percentage point reduction 
in violence. This is a large effect and supports the idea that the protective effect of female 
property ownership is not restricted to the particular case of Kerala but also works 
towards dissuading violence in a North Indian context. 
25Turning briefly to the other variables we see that consistent with the bulk of the 
literature the amount of land owned by a household is negatively linked to violence but 
the effect is not statistically significant. Similarly, the estimates show that families 
residing in a pucca as opposed to a kuccha house are 17 to 25 percentage points less 
likely to experience violence, but the effect is not very precisely measured. The effect of 
husband’s occupation (an indicator of household income) is large and shows that 
husbands who are self-employed in agriculture (the highest income category) are 32 to 37 
percentage points less likely to inflict violence as compared to husbands involved in non-
agricultural occupations.
19 Overall, the results support the idea that violence is less likely 
to occur amongst higher income and wealthier households. 
Consistent with expectations, a husband’s education works towards reducing 
violence.  The estimated effect reflects the correlation between education and income 
which reduces economic stress and the status-conferring effect of education which 
reduces social stress. A one-year increase in a man’s education is associated with a 2.5 to 
2.9 percentage point reduction in violence. While a woman’s education also exerts a 
negative effect, it is not statistically significant.
20 
The number of sons, daughters and type of family are not associated with 
violence. In section IV, we argued that after controlling for household economic 
resources, caste should not have a bearing on domestic violence. To examine this 
empirically, Table 8, specification 6 includes a set of caste and religion dummies.  The 
19 We prefer to use occupational status indicators to capture household income as these variables are less 
likely to be plagued by measurement error as compared to the income information. Nevertheless, we 
estimate specifications which do control for the income of the husband and wife (Table A1, spec. 2). The 
inclusion of these measures does not alter the effect of women’s work status and ownership of property. 
20 Rao (1993) and Zhang and Chan (1999) estimate specifications where women’s welfare, are treated as 
functions of educational and age differences between husband and wife. As pointed out by Edlund (2000) 
such specifications impose the restriction that the attributes of husband and wife influence women’s welfare 
in a symmetric manner.  This may not be and is certainly not the case in our data and hence we treat 
violence as a function of individual traits rather than differences. 
26caste variables (other backward castes and scheduled castes) do not exert an effect on 
violence. The religion dummy is also statistically insignificant at conventional levels 
(although the p-value is close to 10 percent). Jointly the set of variables that capture 
family composition, family type and caste are jointly statistically insignificant (p-values 
ranging from 0.30 to 0.35). 
Finally, while alcohol consumption certainly appears to trigger violence (see 
Table 7), as argued earlier, it is likely that unobserved factors (e.g., work pressure, 
temperament) that lead to drunken behaviour are correlated with domestic violence and 
domestic violence and alcohol consumption are endogenous.  Nevertheless, in the spirit 
of conducting a sensitivity analysis we include an indicator of the drinking habits of 
husbands in our estimated models (Table A1, specification 3).  As may be expected there 
is a large and statistically significant effect of drinking on violence.  However, regardless 
of the inclusion of this variable, the magnitude of the coefficient on work status and 
women’s ownership of property, remains in the same range as observed in our baseline 
specifications (2 and 3 in Table 8).
D. Simultaneous equation probit estimates
Despite the stability of the effect of female work status on violence and  the 
inclusion of a number of controls that determine women’s work participation and 
violence, it is possible that there are unobserved characteristics that affect female work 
status and violence.   For example, women who are more motivated and have higher 
economic aspirations may be more likely to seek work and these qualities may also 
encourage   violence.   In   such   circumstances   single   equation   probit   estimates   may 
underestimate the protective effect of women’s employment status.  To account for the 
effect   of   such   unobserved   common   traits,   equation   (1)   and   (2)   are   estimated 
simultaneously.  Maximum likelihood estimates of bivariate probit models are presented 
27in columns 1 to 4 of Table 9, while instrumental variable regression estimates (that is, 
estimating equations 1 and 2 using OLS) are presented in columns 5 and 6. Although not 
entirely appropriate, as the dependent variables are discrete, we use an instrumental 
variables model as this approach allows us to apply specifications tests to examine the 
strength and validity of the instruments.
Estimates of the work status equation (2) are presented in columns 1, 3 and 5 of 
the table while the remaining columns present marginal effects of the probability of 
domestic violence.  The work status equation presented in column 1 is identified on the 
basis of family composition and type while estimates in columns 3 and 5 are identified on 
the basis of family composition, family type and caste variables.
21   On the basis of 
previous literature and knowledge of the context we argued that while caste should play 
an important role in determining women’s work status, after controlling for household 
economic resources, it should not have a bearing on violence. The estimates in Table 9 
(columns 3 and 5) show that belonging to a scheduled caste sharply increases the 
probability of working while as shown earlier, caste does not have an influence on 
domestic violence (see Table 8, column 6). Formal statistical tests show that the 
instruments are correlated with a woman’s work status. An  F-test for excluding the 
instruments records a p-value 0.065 and the partial R-squared of the excluded instruments 
is   0.083.   To   examine   the   validity   of   the  instruments   we  carried   out  a   test  for 
overidentifying restrictions. The test statistic recorded a p-value of 0.419, that is, the test 
does not reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between some of the instruments and 
the error term in the violence equation.
22    
21 We also estimated an additional bivariate probit specification which relied only on the caste variables to 
achieve identification. The estimates were in the same range as reported in Table 9.
22 Instrumental variables estimates based on the caste variables to achieve identification are presented in 
Table A1, columns 4 and 5. These estimates are similar to those reported in Table 9. 
28Turning to the estimates themselves, a glance shows that for the most part, they 
are not sensitive to the variable set used for identification nor to the method of estimation. 
The estimates display that husband’s occupation, education and caste have statistically 
significant and large effects on a woman’s work status.  Women whose husbands are 
engaged as wage labourers are between 44 to 63 percentage points more likely to seek 
paid work as compared to women whose husbands are engaged in non-agricultural 
activities, while, women whose husbands are self-employed in agriculture are about 17 to 
24 percentage points less likely to be engaged in paid work as compared to those whose 
husbands   are   engaged   in   non-agricultural   activities.   Husband’s   education   is   also 
negatively linked to women’s work status and the wives of more educated men less likely 
to work (the marginal effect ranges between 1.6 and 3.8 percentage points). These 
estimates are consistent with the reasons that women provide for seeking work (Section 
II) and support the idea that female work participation is driven by the limited economic 
opportunities faced by their husbands. The caste variable picks up similar patterns, in the 
sense that work participation is about 27 to 37 percentage points more likely amongst 
scheduled caste households. This reflects the constrained economic circumstances of such 
households but also the greater social acceptability of work amongst such families as 
compared to the general castes.   
We now turn to the violence equation (columns 2, 4 and 6). First, regardless of the 
variable set used for identification and the method of estimation, the estimates are quite 
stable. Second, although there are changes in the magnitude of the coefficients, the 
overall story emerging from the simultaneous equation estimates is not very different 
from the single-equation estimates. Husband’s education continues to be associated with 
a reduction in violence and husband’s engaged in more remunerative occupations are less 
likely to use violence. The effect of women’s ownership of property lies in the same 
29range as the single-equation estimates, it remains statistically significant and continues to 
exert a protective effect. The effect of a woman’s work status also exerts a protective 
effect but is much larger as compared to the single equation estimates. These estimates 
indicate that women engaged in regular paid work outside the household are 62 to 64 
percentage points less likely to experience violence as compared to non-working women. 
The jump in the magnitude of this coefficient supports the idea that it is important to 
account for the simultaneous determination of violence and women’s work participation. 
While a doubling of the coefficient may seem large it is not unusual. For example, in 
their study of low-income women in the United States, Gibson-Davies et al. (2005) show 
that estimates that do not account for the endogeneity between domestic violence and 
employment grossly overestimate the effect of women’s employment status on abuse. 
According to their estimates, single-equation probit estimates reveal a zero or even a 
positive relationship between employment and abuse, while their instrumental variable 
probit estimates show that for all types of violence, employment is associated with a 
reduction in violence of between 4 to 8 percentage points (that is, an infinite increase in 
the magnitude of the employment status coefficients between the single and simultaneous 
equation estimates).  The sharp increases in the simultaneous equation estimates supports 
the idea that at the very least, based on the single-equation estimates,  women’s 
engagement in regular paid agricultural work (as compared to women who do not work 
for wages or are self-employed on the family farm) reduces the incidence of violence by 
24 to 29 percentage points. 
VI. Concluding remarks
On the basis of a micro-level village study this paper explored the link between 
the effect of women’s ownership of their household dwelling and the effect of their 
regular employment (at least 6 months of the year) in paid work on intra-spousal 
30violence. A notable feature of the empirical work presented in the paper is that it 
controlled for the potentially endogenous relationship between women’s engagement in 
paid work and spousal violence. 
The study showed that women’s employment in regular paid work has a large 
effect on reducing violence. The effect of women’s work status reflects the tension 
between the reduction of violence which may be generated by the effect of her work on 
increasing the economic resources of the household and the increases in violence which 
may be generated due to challenges to a husband’s authority and masculinity (social 
stress). In the case under investigation it seems clear that the enhanced economic 
resources generated by the work contribution of a woman works towards reducing intra-
household violence.  Whether her work contribution also leads to greater mobility and 
enhances   her   intra-household   decision-making   locus   still   needs   to   be   thoroughly 
investigated.
23 Methodologically, this paper showed that it is important to treat female 
work status and violence as simultaneously determined. Estimates that do not account for 
the possibility that violence may motivate a woman to seek work, are more likely to draw 
the misleading conclusion that women’s work status does not provide any protection but 
is indeed associated with an increased incidence of violence.           
Beyond women’s work status, across all specifications we found that women’s 
ownership of property has a large effect on reducing violence. This is similar to the effect 
reported by Panda and Agarwal (2005) in the Kerala context. A similar finding in a very 
different context suggests the wider implications of female ownership of property and 
lends support to their view that women’s ownership of property increases a woman’s 
economic security, reduces her willingness to tolerate violence and by providing a 
credible exit option works towards deterring spousal violence.  
23 Preliminary investigations reported in Bhattacharyya (2006) suggest that this may not be the case.
31Overall, the results presented in this paper suggest that women’s access to 
income-generating opportunities and control over assets play a key role in reducing their 
vulnerability  to violence.  Policies  which  encourage income-generation  and  greater 
involvement of women in regular paid work outside their homes and help women build 
and retain control over assets are necessary in order to increase their security.   
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Incidence of physical violence (%) [absolute numbers]







Incidence of physical violence (% of total) [absolute numbers]
Reported by husbands











N 65 44 109
36Table 5






Neglecting housework 46.4 45.7
Crossing the private sphere 11.2 5.0
Release for husband’s 
frustration/tension/anger 
0.0 14.8
Release tension/anger under 
the influence of alcohol
2.8 16.0
Without any reason 0.0 13.6
Infidelity 0.0 2.5
N 71 81
Note: Based on multiple responses
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Land owned by household (in bighas)
Condition of house – pucca
Condition of house – kuccha-pucca
Quantity of gold (in grams)
Husband’s education (in years)
Husband’s age 
Husband’s annual income in Rupees
Husband drinks = 1
Wife’s education (in years)
Wife’s annual income in Rupees 
Wife’s age 
Wife owns house 
Number of living sons
Number of living daughters
Nuclear family = 1
Hindu – General = 1
Hindu – Other Backward Castes = 1








































Notes: The number of observations is 155 except for the variable indicating husband’s 
drinking habits where N = 125
. 
37Table 7
Domestic Violence and Selected Characteristics
Variable DV  = 0 DV = 1 p-value
Land owned by household (in bighas)
Condition of house – pucca
Husband’s education (in years)
Husband’s age 
Husband’s main activity-agricultural wage labourer
Husband’s main activity-self-employed in agriculture
Husband’s annual income in Rupees
Husband drinks = 1
Wife’s education (in years)
Wife’s age 
Wife’s annual income in Rupees
Wife engaged in paid work outside home 
Wife owns house
Number of living sons
Number of living daughters
Family type: Nuclear 
Hindu – General = 1
Hindu – Other Backward Castes = 1






























































Notes:  The last column of the table reports p-values for a two-tail t-test. The null 
hypothesis is equality of means.   The number of observations is 155 except for the 
variable indicating husband’s drinking habits where N = 125
38Table 8
Probability of Experiencing Violence – Probit Estimates

















Land owned by household
Condition of house – pucca
Condition of house – kuccha-pucca
Amount of gold in household
Husband’s education
Husband’s age
Husband’s occupation – agri. wage labourer
Husband’s occupation – agri. self-employed 
Wife’s education 
Wife’s age
Wife’s occupation – agri. wage labourer
Wife’s occupation – agri. self-employed
Wife’s occupation – non-agricultural
Wife engaged in paid work outside home
Wife owns house
Number of male children
Number of female children
Nuclear family
Hindu - other backward castes = 1



























































































































































































Notes: The t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. * Statistically 
significant at, at least the 10 percent level.
39Table 9
Probability of Experiencing Violence and Working – Instrumental Variable Probit 
and Bivariate Probit Estimates



































Land owned by household
Condition of house – pucca
Condition of house – kuccha-pucca
Amount of gold in household
Husband’s education
Husband’s age
Husband’s occupation – agri. wage labourer
Husband’s occupation – agri. self-employed 
Wife’s education 
Wife’s age
Wife works outside home
Wife owns house
Number of male children
Number of female children
Nuclear family
Hindu - other backward castes = 1



































































































































































































Partial R-squared of excluded instruments












Notes: * Statistically significant at, at least the 10 percent level.
40Table A1: Additional Sensitivity Analysis






















Land owned by household
Condition of house – pucca
Condition of house – kuccha-pucca
Amount of gold in household
Husband’s education
Husband’s age
Husband’s occupation – agri. wage labourer
Husband’s occupation – agri. self-employed 
Wife’s education 
Wife’s age
Wife’s occupation – agri. wage labourer
Wife’s occupation – agri. self-employed





Hindu - other backward castes = 1


















































































































(0.10)   
-0.017*
(2.04)   
0.0001
(0.01)   
0.435*

















(0.40)   
0.276*






































Partial R-squared of excluded instruments   













Notes:  The t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors  * Statistically 
significant at, at least the 10 percent level. 
a This is the same specification reported as specification 3 in 
Table 8. 
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